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RECENT CASES

In summing up the Dawson case the Supreme Court gives what appears to
be the real reason behind the decision. They say, "We are unable to see how the
defendant or society will in any way be benefited by denying the plaintiff a divorce. There seems to be no possible hope of any reconciliation. The parties have
now been separated for over ten years, either of which apparently with the acquiescence of the defendant. If the aim of the statute is, as has been held, to legally
end a marriage which no longer exists in fact, then this, we think, is an appropriate case to carry that aim into effect."19 This position is reminiscent of the view
taken by the majority of courts who find the fault of the plaintiff no bar to the
action.
Regardless of whether this decision is termed a misconstruction of the 1941
amendment or not, it places Wyoming in a hazy ground between the majority and
the minority views. It no longer would seem necessary for the plaintiff to plead
or prove he was not the cause of the separation. Thus in a non-contested case the
question of whether the plaintiff was responsible for the separation will not arise,
and Wyoming is no different than the state that opening permits either party to
sue. Only where the defendant raises the issue and then sustains the burden of
proof (which may be difficult in view of the Jegendorf case) will Wyoming bar
the plaintiff from maintaining the action. Since so few divorces are contested,
this would seem to place Wyoming with the majority.
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PART TIME EMPLOYEES UNDER

MOTOR CARRIER ACT

Levinson, an employee whose chief duty was that of a foreman of loaders
of freight for a trucking concern which carried freight in interstate commerce,
brought action to recover' overtime compensation, liquidated damages, and attorney fees under the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Recovery was allowed in the Municipal Court of Chicago. On appeal the Appelate
Court of Illinois reversed the judgment. 1 The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed 2
and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, by a six to three
decision, that where a substantial part of an employee's activities affected safety
of operation he was subject to the Interstate Commerce Commission's jurisdiction
and deprived of protection of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Levinson v. Spector
Motor Service, 330 U. S. 649, 67 Sup. Ct. 931 (1947).
Section 207 of the Fair Labor Standards Act limits the work week at the
normal rate of pay of all employees subject to its terms and provides for overtime
compensation. Certain employees are excepted from its terms by Section 213 (b)
(1)3 including any employee with respect to whom the Interstate Commerce
19.

177 P. (2d) 200, 203 (Wyo. 1947).

1. Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 323 II. App. 505, 56 N. E. (2d) 142 (1944).
2. Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 389 I11.466, 59 N. E. (2d) 817 (1945).
3. 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C .A. Sec. 213 (b) (1).
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Commission has power to establish qualification and maximum hours of service
pursuant to provision of Section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935.4
The legislative history of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 indicates that
Congress intended one of the primary purposes of the act to be the promotion and
enhancement of safety of operation of motor vehicles operated by carriers engaged
in interstate commerce. 5 It was solely to this end that Congress empowered the
Interstate Commerce Commission to prescribe qualifications and maximum hours
of service for employees of motor carriers. It has been held that the commission
6
has no jurisdiction to regulate the qualifications or hours of service of others.
Accordingly, the exemption provided by Section 213 (b) (1) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act with respect to those employees as to whom the Commission has
power to prescribe qualifications and maximum hours of service was enacted upon
7
the assumption that the Commission's power was limited to "safety employees".
Levinson was an employee of a motor carrier and his chief duty was the
supervision of loaders of the trucks bound for interstate commerce. His services
may have affected the safety of operation but to what extent is open to debate.
In Richardson v. James Gibbons Company8 the Commission's power was upheld

as to an employee who testified that he was employed 25% of the time as a truck
driver and 75% of the time as a distribution-operator of liquid asphalt. His work
was accepted as affecting safety of operations although 75% of his time was spent
on other duties. This conclusion recognizes that an employee, who is engaged in
a class of work that affects safety of operations, is not necessarily engaged during
every hour of every day in activities that directly affect safety of operations but
during only that part of the time while he is driving.
The majority opinion, in the present case, gave much weight to the fact that
the Commission had decided that it had jurisdiction of loaders. 9 It rested its
decision upon a literal reading of the statute and upon the need to give full effect
to the safety program to which Congress had attached primary importance. The
court was of the opinion that the character of the activities rather than the proportion of either the employee's time or of his activities determines he actual need
for the Commission's power to establish reasonable requirements.
The dissent took the position that the problem centered around the exemption section which they concede, "read literally . . . would exempt all employees

who do any work affecting safety operations". But they counter, "rigidly literal
application of a statute may be ruinous to achieving its purpose". The court has
many times said that all construction is the ascertainment of meaning and literalness may strangle meaning. 10 It has also been said that if the giving words of a
4.
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49 Stat. 543, 49 U. S. C. A. Sec. 301 (Supp. 1946).
Preamble, Motor Carrier Act, 49 Stat. 543, 49 U. S. C. A. Sec. 302 (a) (Supp. 1946).
The Dill Bill, S 3171, 73 Cong., 2nd Session and S 1629, 74 Cong., 1st Session was
finally enacted as the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 and it authorized the commission
to investigate the need of Federal regulation . . . of the qualifications and maximum
hours of service of employees of motor carriers. . ..
United States v. American Trucking Association Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 60 Sup. Ct.
1059, 80 L. Ed. 1345 (1940).
Overnight Motor Transportation Co. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 572, 582, 62 Sup. Ct. 1216,
1222 (1942).
319 U. S. 44, 63 Sup. Ct. 917, 87 L. Ed. 1244 (1943).
March 4, 1941, 28 M. C. C. 125 Ex parte Nos. MC-2, 3.
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statute their natural significance fails to carry out the intent of Congress the court
then must look to the reason of the enactment so their purpose will not fail.11
The general purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act and of the Motor
Carrier Act are not necessarily conflicting. With the adoption of the Motor
Carrier Act the national government undertook the regulation of interstate motor
transportation to secure the benefits of an efficient system. Safety through establishment of maximum hours for drivers was an important consideration. 12 The
Fair Labor Standards Act was designed to extend the frontiers of social progress
by insuring to all able-bodied working men and women a fair day's pay for a
fair day's work.1 3 It contains certain exempting provisions which are to be narrowly construed in the light of and in order to accomplish the same statutory
purpose.1 4 It has been stated that the legislative intent in enacting the exemption
section was to free operators of motor vehicles from regulation by two agencies of
the hours of drivers upon the understanding that the Interstate Commerce Commission had already acted upon maximum hours for drivers.1 5 In the Overnight
Case)6 the court said that by exempting the drivers of motors from the maximum
hours limitation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, Congress evidently relied upon
the Motor Carrier provisions to work out satisfactory adjustment for employees
charged with the safety of operations in a business requiring fluctuating hours of
employment, without the burden of additional pay for overtime. This bears out
the fact that Congress did not have in mind such an expansive and destructive
exemption as the majority opinion would produce. Its principal concern was with
drivers and not, as in the instant case, with employees whose duties only partially
involve safety and then quite indirectly.
It is apparent that the majority opinion has only the words of the statute to
support it. The court seems to be dealing with a borderline case outside the
original contemplation of Congress, and its decision does damage to the general
congressional policies of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It would seem the practical effect of this decision will enable employers to abuse the Court's interpretation. Non-safety employees may be assigned small portions of their total service
to safety operations and thereby become exempt from overtime compensation.
FRANK C.
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